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Indigenous Belonging:  A Commentary on Membership and Identity in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
 









I. Introduction: The lack of definition and the interplay of legal regimes 
 
The recognition of Indigenous peoples’ right to determine their own membership is crucial   for 
their ability to meaningfully exercise their right to self-determination.
1
  The Declaration 
addresses rights of membership directly in Articles 9 (right to belong); 33 (right to determine 
membership); 35 (right to determine responsibilities of members); and 36 (right to maintain 
relations across borders).  Together, these provisions reinforce the right of Indigenous peoples to 
define themselves, both in terms of membership and geographic scope. 
 
The lack of definition of who Indigenous people are, has already been mentioned in previous 
chapters.  During the drafting of the Declaration, representatives of Indigenous peoples stressed 
the importance of self-identification.  However, some States argued that the lack of a fixed 
definition would create a circularity whereby people who claimed to be Indigenous would define 
indigeneity based on the criterion that they themselves defined. 
 
A similar problem arises when discussing membership in an Indigenous group or community. 
Article 9 recognizes that “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an 
Indigenous community or nation” suggesting that it if a group or individual claims indigeneity, 
they have a right to belong to the group. But Article 9 also stipulates that this right is to be 
exercised “in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned”, 
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which suggests that the community or nation determines who belongs and who does not. Like the 
question of indigeneity itself, the question of belonging becomes circular in that one segment of 
those who claim to be members of an Indigenous community would self-identify as members, 
perhaps denying recognition to others who also claim to be members of that community.          
 
The only way out of the circularity of indigeneity and membership is to accept there are pre-
existing groups that can act as reference points for acceptance. This pre-existing group will 
decide which “customs and traditions” will determine who are members and who are not. As a 
practical matter, it makes sense to begin with what is already there.  
 
State laws come into play because indigeneity and membership in an Indigenous community 
may provide access to special protections and benefits from the State. Because this access is 
dependent on State recognition of indigeneity and Indigenous peoples, tensions can arise when 
Indigenous peoples feel that the State’s definitions are too narrow, thereby restricting access to 
benefits, or Sates are too generous in their definitions, thereby diluting the benefits available.  
 
Finally, the international human rights norms can affect both decisions of States and decisions of 
Indigenous peoples.  We discuss below decisions of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights that have expanded State 
understandings of indigeneity. International standards relating to human rights may also apply to 
the actions of Indigenous governments themselves. We discuss the problems that arise with 
American tribes that are “disenrolling” long- time members for reasons that may have to do more 
with the distribution of cash from casinos than with cultural integrity. Are American Indian 
tribes subject to the gender equality and international human rights norms set out in Articles 44 
and 46 of the Declaration?  If so, should States legislate compliance with Articles 44 and 46? 
 
This chapter will attempt to weave together the interaction of the laws of Indigenous peoples 
themselves with the laws of the State and international human rights norms. We use existing 
State practice to inform an interpretation of the provisions that is consistent with the spirit and 
intent of the Declaration, while recognizing the challenges faced in practical implementation. We 
feel that a somewhat detailed discussion of State practice is important because an abstract 
discussion will not help resolve the difficult rights and interests that are in play. By evaluating 
current State practice in relation to the standards set out in the Declaration, we hope to encourage 
the generation of the concrete ideas needed to make the aspirations of the Declaration a reality.
 2
   
  
 
II. Drafting History: Right to Belong, Right to Determine Membership, Right to Determine 
Responsibilities of Members and Right to Maintain Relations Across Borders 
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The lengthy discussions leading to the drafting of the Declaration focused largely on whether and 
how to define “Indigenous people” and what would characterize a group or people as 
“Indigenous.” By contrast, relatively little attention was paid to the wording of the articles that 
are the focus of this chapter. However, these articles play an important role in reinforcing the 
rights of Indigenous peoples to define themselves, particularly given that the final version of the 
Declaration contains no definition of the term “Indigenous.”  
 
The extent to which the concerns of States and Indigenous observers were incorporated into or 
are absent from the final draft of the Declaration provides important insight into the often deeply 
divergent view of States and Indigenous groups on whether and how Indigenous peoples can 
define themselves, their membership, and their responsibilities. 
 
 
A. Article 9  
 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community 
or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation 
concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the exercise of such a right. 
 
During discussions in early Working Groups, a number of States raised concerns about Article 
9’s proposed reference to the right to belong to Indigenous “nations” on the basis that possible 
confusion could arise between use of the term “nations” in the Draft and the more frequently-




At the December 10, 1996 Working Group, some States advised that they considered the term 
“nation” in the context of Article 9 to mean “communities.” The representative of Brazil 
suggested that the reference to “nation” in Article 9 be removed and that the text instead state 
that “[i]ndigenous people have the right to belong to an indigenous community.” Similarly, the 
representative of Australia stated that further discussion was needed on Article 9 and the 
meaning of the word “nation,” and that Australia could not support the term if the meaning went 
beyond the concept of “first nations.” 
 
By contrast, however, Indigenous organizations took the position that the term “nation” was an 
accurate depiction of their political and legal status.
4
 In particular, observers for the International 
Organization of Indigenous Resource Development, the Saami Council and the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission all expressed strong support for Article 9.  
 
Some participants also raised concerns with the use of the term “discrimination” and proposed 
that the term be clarified by substituting alternative words such as “disadvantage” or “adverse 
discrimination.” Although all States agreed that members of Indigenous collectivities should not 
be subject to discrimination as a result of such a membership, many States still believed it was 
necessary to strike a balance between their national human rights obligations and non-
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 Some States suggested including the expression “where those traditions and 
customs are consistent with international human rights standards,” but after deliberation agreed 
that inclusion of such an expression was unnecessary. 
 
Many Indigenous representatives stressed that Article 9 in the Sub-Commission text was 
significant because their peoples did not have recognition as nations or communities and as such 






B. Withdrawn Article 8 
 
An original draft of the Declaration included an Article 8 that provided as follows: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their 
distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as 




This Article would have clarified that, once an Indigenous people had identified itself as 
Indigenous, the State would have the obligation to recognize them as such. This Article was 
supported by Indigenous groups, but States raised a number of questions, including the relation 
between collective and individual rights, adherence to international human rights norms and the 
financial responsibility placed on States if the only criterion were self- identification.
8
 The 
United States suggested a list of characteristics that could be considered for State recognition: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to be recognized as such by the State through a 
transparent and reasonable process. When recognizing indigenous peoples states should 
include a variety of factors, including, but not limited to: 
 
 Whether the group self-identifies as indigenous;  
 Whether the group is comprised of descendants of persons who inhabited a 
geographic area prior to the sovereignty of the State; 
 Whether the group historically had been sovereign; 
 Whether the group maintains a distinct community and aspects of governmental 
structure;  
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 Whether the group has a cultural affinity with a particular area of land or 
territories;  
 Whether the group has distinct objective characteristics such as language, 
religion, culture; and, 
 Whether the group has been historically regarded and treated as Indigenous by the 
State. 
 
The Article was deleted in the Chairman’s proposal in 2006. There is nothing in the report 





C. Article 33 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of Indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures. 
 
Article 33, which addresses Indigenous peoples’ right to determine their own membership or 
identity was subject to relatively little debate during the drafting of the Declaration. It is clearly 
related to Article 9 and the withdrawn Article 8, and most of the discussion was on those 
Articles.  The discussions that did occur in relation to the rights in Article 33 focused on the 
concerns of some States that allowing a separate form of Indigenous citizenship would conflict 
with their own national legislation. For example, at an Inter-Sessional Working Group in 1995, 
Ukraine said that the provision pertaining to the collective right of Indigenous peoples to 





However, many Indigenous organizations said that the right to determine their citizenship in 
accordance with their own customs and traditions was an essential part of the exercise of the 
inherent right to self-determination,
11
 and the text that was ultimately adopted in the Declaration 
reflects this position. 
 
 
D. Article 35 
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Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of individuals to their 
communities. 
 
An early version of Article 35 appears in the First Revised Text of the Declaration in 1989, 
which stated that Indigenous peoples have “the right to determine the responsibilities of 
individuals to their own community, consistent with universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”
12
 In subsequent versions of this Article, the reference to the requirement 





A number of States pointed to the potential tension between this Article and the fulfillment of 
international human rights norms, and several States proposed revised versions of the Article 
which explicitly provided that this right would accord with international human rights standards, 
as in the initial draft.
14
  Notwithstanding these concerns, however, the final version of this Article 
is silent on this requirement.   
  
 
E. Article 36 
 
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to 
maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for 
spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as 
well as other peoples across borders. 
 
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, shall take effective 
measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right. 
 
An early draft of what became Article 36 can be found in the Declaration of Principles adopted 
by the Indigenous Peoples in 1987, which stated that “Indigenous nations and peoples have the 
right freely to travel, and to maintain economic, social, cultural and religious relations with each 
other across State borders.”
15
 Parallels can also be seen between Article 36 and ILO Convention 
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169, which states that “Governments shall take appropriate measures, including by means of 
international agreements, to facilitate contacts and cooperation between indigenous and tribal 
peoples across borders, including activities in the economic, social, cultural, spiritual and 
environmental fields.”
16
 In support of this provision, one Indigenous observer noted that “where 
a boundary imposed by nation States divides or cuts through aboriginal lands, guarantees should 
be provided so as not to make immigrants out of Indigenous peoples who have occupied that 
territory since time immemorial.”17 
 
By 1993, the Draft Declaration as agreed upon by the members of the Working Group at its 
Eleventh Session included wording for Article 36 very similar to the final text, including the 
requirement that States “take effective measures to ensure the exercise and implementation” of 
the right.
18
  States expressed two major concerns. 
 
First, the inclusion of this positive obligation on States raised concerns. For example, in 1996, 
the representative of Canada suggested that the States only be obligated to “facilitate” contacts 19 
and in 2004, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland 




Second, States were concerned about impacts on the right to control entry through State custom 
and immigration requirements.
21
  Canada suggested that this should be subject to “reasonable 
and universal border control measures”.
 22
 In an effort to address these concerns, in 2004 the 
Chairman presented a summary of proposals with respect to what became Article 36 (then 
Article 35), which included reference to States taking effective measures to ensure the 




Notwithstanding this proposal, the final version of the text is silent on the issue of border control, 
but explicitly requires that States take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the 
implementation of cross-border rights. The final text of Article 36 is thus largely consistent with 
the views expressed by Indigenous participants in the course of the drafting process.  
 
 
III. Analysis of Article 9:  The Right to Belong 
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This Article sets out obligations of the State to recognize the “right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation.” In the next section of this chapter, we will discuss Article 33, which 
addresses the right of Indigenous people to decide on identity or membership in accordance with 
their customs and traditions.  
 
A textual analysis of Article 9 raises the following questions: 
 
(A)  What is the obligation of the State to recognize peoples as Indigenous? 
(B)   What is the obligation of the State to recognize individuals as Indigenous? 
(C)   What is the obligation of the State to recognize the “right to belong”? 
(D)   What is the “discrimination” that the State is obligated to avoid? 
 
 
A. What is the obligation of the State to recognize peoples as Indigenous? 
 
The fact that the Declaration does not define “Indigenous peoples” poses practical challenges in 
implementing and enforcing State obligations which require recognition of peoples as 
Indigenous. Article 9 and Article 33 suggest that self-identification is the main criterion in 
determining Indigeneity,
24
 but if this were the case, then any group could self-identify as 
Indigenous and compel the State to recognize them as such.  For example, a group of white 




As drafted, the Articles in the Declaration are ambiguous on what body is entitled to determine  
whether a people are “Indigenous.”  As mentioned previously in this Chapter, an early version of 
the draft Declaration contained a version of Article 8 that would have provided Indigenous 
people with the right to “identify themselves as Indigenous and to be recognized as such.”
26
 This 
clause would have obligated States to recognize peoples that self-declared as Indigenous, but its 
deletion leaves unresolved the question of which entity that has the authority to identify 
indigeneity. 
 
 In practice various domestic and international bodies are developing a list of characteristics that 
will help identify a group as “Indigenous”. For example, the United Nations Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues (“Permanent Forum”) set out the following criteria for a “modern 
understanding” of indigeneity: 
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• self- identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the 
community as their member; 
• historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies;  
• strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources;  
• distinct social, economic or political systems;  
• distinct language, culture and beliefs;  
• form non-dominant groups of society; and 
• resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as 
distinctive peoples and communities.27 
 
 
In the following paragraphs in this section, we describe how the issue of identify has been 
addressed in different regions of the world.  
 
(i) Indigenous peoples in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand 
 
The criteria for the ¨modern understanding¨ of indigeneity were originally derived from the 
experiences of   Indigenous peoples in the Americas, New Zealand and Australia.  For these 
groups, the concept of “historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies” was an 
accurate reflection of historical reality.  The author of  an early attempt to identify criteria, José 
Martínez Cobo , the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities,  stated in 1986 that the term “Indigenous” should be restricted to 
situations where there was a European invasion, and should not be applied to the peoples of 
Africa and Asia.
28
 However, as the concept of indigeneity began to be explored globally, the 
“pre-colonial” or “pre-settler” criteria became increasingly difficult to apply. 
29
 As will be 
discussed below, international courts, human rights bodies and governments are now modifying 
the “pre-colonial” requirement by recognizing Indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia, as well as 
peoples in the Americas who came into being during the period of colonization. 
 
 (ii) Indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia   
 
In Africa and Asia, colonization imposed a European-dominated political and economic system 
on populations that were indigenous to the territory. In this sense, all of the non-European people 
in those colonies were “indigenous” and subsequently marginalized through the process of 
colonization. This dynamic made it difficult for some African nations in the post-colonial context 
to see how one segment of their population could be “Indigenous” while another segment was 
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Nonetheless, newly independent African States were forced to confront the reality that within 
each country, some groups had become economically and politically dominant over others. In 
2005, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights produced a pioneering report which highlighted the relevance of 
the concept of indigeneity to Africa, including the issue of dominant groups within nation States 
post-colonization: 
 
The Indigenous movement in Africa has grown as a response to the policies adopted by 
independent post-colonial African States. As argued by Mohamed Salih, post-colonial 
African States have in many respects continued the suppression, dispossession and 
discrimination that were initiated by the colonial regimes: ‘post post-independent African 




While an exhaustive list  of peoples in Africa who identify as Indigenous does not yet exist, the 
Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee describes the peoples in Africa that 
would be recognized by the Declaration as including “those who have been living by hunting and 
gathering or by transhumant (migratory nomadic) pastoralism.”
32
 The concept of indigeneity in 
the African context was further articulated by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 2009 in a decision dealing with a dispute between the government of Kenya and a 
group claiming Indigenous rights.  The case was brought by the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development, a Kenyan NGO, on behalf of the Endorois, who are pastoralists that had, for 
hundreds of years, raised cattle on the fertile land around Lake Bogoria.  The government of 
Kenya evicted the Endorois in order create game preserves. Ultimately the Commission found 
that the Endorois were Indigenous within the meaning of the Declaration, and went on to 
describe four key characteristics of indigeneity: 
 
[T]he occupation and use of a specific territory; the voluntary perpetuation of cultural 
distinctiveness; self-identification as a distinct collectivity, as well as recognition by other 





It is noteworthy that this formulation does not include the ‘pre-colonial’ or ‘pre-settler’ 
requirement as part of indigeneity in Africa.   
 
In Asia, identifying certain groups as Indigenous is complicated by the difficulty of establishing 
chronological priority in many cases.  Addressing this problem in the context of Nepal, James 
Anaya explains: 
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The country’s population overall is the product of a long and complex history of original 
settlement and migration both into and within the territory of present-day Nepal, and of 





Nevertheless, while all citizens of Asian States are ‘indigenous’ vis-a-vis European colonialists,  
as in Africa, there are clearly certain groups within these countries that are politically and 
economically marginalized relative to others.  
 
State practice in Asia varies.  Nepal recognizes a number of groups as Indigenous (Adivasi 
Janajati) and Taiwan has extensive legislation in relation to Indigenous people. 
35
 India, on the 
other hand, does not recognize the existence of Indigenous peoples within its borders even 
though its Constitution provides for over 600 Scheduled Tribes who generally identify as 




  (iii) Indigenous peoples because of, but not before, colonial invasion 
 
In the Americas, where there was a much clearer ‘invasion’ by the Europeans, defining the 
concept of indigeneity has become complex and cannot be accurately captured by a simplistic 
delineation based on the date of arrival of the settlers. 
 
In areas of Latin America, there exist communities of escaped slaves, sometimes referred to as 
Maroons or afrodescidientes, who have lived in their own communities within the jungles and in 
the countryside for hundreds of years. Of course, these groups did not precede the arrival of the 
Europeans, but they are clearly the result of colonization. They are socially, economically and 
geographically marginalized and identify as Indigenous vis a vis the dominant groups in their 
country. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the indigeneity of 
afrodescidientes in their 2007 ruling on a complaint against the Suriname government regarding 
resource extraction within the territory of the Saramaka, an afrodescidiente group. The Court 
found that the Saramaka were a ‘tribal people’ within the meaning of the ILO 169,
37
  and drew 
heavily from the United Nations Declaration to articulate the rights of the Saramaka.
 38
 As a 
remedy, the Court ordered the Suriname government to demarcate Saramaka territory and to stop 
resource extraction until the free, prior, informed consent of the Saramaka was obtained.
39
 In 
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 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 172 (28 November 2007). 
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Bolivia, the situation of the afrodescidientes is explicitly recognized in the Constitution, which 
provides that the afrodescidientes enjoy the same rights as Indigenous people.
40
   
 
There are other groups in Latin America, often referred to as campesinos, who hold land 
communally.  In Peru, the campesino communities originated in indigenous populations but over 
time became agricultural workers on large haciendas. With land reform in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
the workers were given land which they largely worked collectively.  These communities have 
their own legal mechanisms and see themselves as distinct from both the mainstream Peruvian 
population and from the Indigenous population. The current constitution distinguishes between 
comunidades campesinas and comunidades nativas,
41
 although in the 1930s they were both 
referred to as indígenas.
42
 For the purposes of international law, however, Peru recognizes both 
comunidades campesinas and comunidades nativas as Indigenous, and as such both qualify as 




In Canada, the Métis people came into being as the result of the union of French or English fur 
traders with Indigenous women, creating a distinct group that was neither European nor Indian. 
In one area of Canada, the Métis developed their own language and participated in two revolts in 
1870 and 1885 in order to secure their own homeland within Canada.
44
 The Canadian 
government has since acknowledged that the Métis are a distinct Aboriginal people and in 1982 




 (iv) Conclusion on State obligations to Indigenous peoples 
 
One of the challenges inherent in attempting to achieve a “modern” understanding of indigeneity 
is the fact that the generally accepted criterion for determining who is Indigenous is a 
combination of chronological factors (“pre-colonial”), relational factors (“non-dominant”), 
subjective factors (“resolve to maintain ancestral environments”) and normative factors (“strong 
link to territories”).
46
  The discussion above shows that the term “Indigenous” is not to be 
understood by a single factor but rather a combination of factors which may or may not all be 
present. As the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, James Anaya suggests, the term 
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 Shrinkhal (n 29 ) p 190. 
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“Indigenous” is better understood as a rubric that is defined by “context rather than 
abstraction.”
47
   
 
 
B. What is the obligation of the State to recognize individuals as Indigenous? 
 
The discussion above has provided an outline of the types of peoples that have been recognized 
as Indigenous either by state practice or views of international bodies.  In this section we will 
discuss the obligations imposed by Article 9 on States to recognize the right of Indigenous 
individuals to belong to an Indigenous community or nation.  This obligation is particularly 
important to three types of  individuals who may self-identify as Indigenous and have 
genealogical ties to an Indigenous people, but do not belong to a specific Indigenous community 
or nation.  
 
The first group consists of those who have lost their connection to their community through the 
process of colonization. For example, many Māori in Aotearoa/New Zealand are not registered 
with an iwi (tribe) as a result of migration to urban centres and government policies hostile to 
tribal organizations.
48
   
 
The second group consists of those who have been excluded by state legislation. In Canada, the 
federal government´s Indian Act determines membership in ‘Indian’ bands and for nearly one 
hundred years provided that Indian women who married non-Indian men lost their status as 
Indians. For Indian women who married non-Indian men, this led to the severing of legal ties to 
the Indian community and loss of rights to reside on reserve, both for the women and their 





The third group consists of those who were once members of an Indigenous group but were 
subsequently excluded by the rules of the Indigenous community itself. This group includes 
former members of American Indian tribes who have been “disenrolled,” as discussed below in 




We discuss each of these three groups in more detail below. 
 
(i)  Indigenous individuals who are not members of an Indigenous group 
 
                                                 
47
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Article 9 States that only Indigenous individuals have a right to belong. The first question then, is 
what criteria are used to identify an individual who does not belong to an Indigenous community 
or nation as Indigenous? 
 
This issue was discussed before the enactment of the Declaration by the Human Rights 
Committee in two cases related to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. That Article provides: 
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language. 
 
In the first case, from 1977, Lovelace v. Canada,
51
 a Maliseet woman from Canada had been 
removed from membership in her band after she married a non-Indian as a result of the operation 
of the Indian Act. After her marriage ended, she was not permitted to regain membership to the 
band and consequently lost many of the benefits associated with membership, such as the right to 
vote or the right to live on the reserve. When she applied for housing on reserve, the Band 
Council stated that priority for housing on reserve was to be given to those who were registered 
as Indians under the Indian Act.  The Human Rights Committee found that Canadian legislation 
harmed Lovelace by preventing her from registering as an Indian.  
 
The second case, from 1989, Kitok v. Sweden,
52
  revisited the same issue, this time in the case of 
Saami man who had lost his rights to herd reindeer under Sweden’s Reindeer Husbandry Act 
when he left the practice for a number of years. The Act permitted the Saami village to decide 
whether to permit an individual who was ethnically Saami to return to farm reindeer.  In this 
case, the village refused to reinstate full reindeer farming rights to Kitok, citing concerns with 
the number of people that could be supported in the practice. Kitok appealed to a Swedish 
tribunal, but the tribunal upheld the decision of the Saami village.  
 
The Lovelace and Kitok cases are significant to our discussion here because in both cases the 
Committee had to first determine whether the individual was entitled to belong to the Indigenous 
group. In the case of Sandra Lovelace, the Committee observed: 
 
Persons who are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with their 
community and wish to maintain these ties must normally be considered as belonging to 
that minority within the meaning of the Covenant. Since Sandra Lovelace is ethnically a 
Maliseet Indian and has only been absent from her home reserve for a few years during 
the existence of her marriage, she is, in the opinion of the Committee, entitled to be 
regarded as "belonging" to this minority….
53
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In the case of Ivan Kitok, the Committee noted:  
 
Mr. Kitok has always retained some links with the Saami community, always living on 
Saami lands and seeking to return to full-time reindeer farming as soon as it became 




These two examples suggest that indigeneity of individuals needs to be established in relation to 
a recognized Indigenous people through a combination of genealogy and continued ties to an 
existing Indigenous community or nation.   
 
We can see a similar approach in Canada in cases involving the Métis. As we mentioned earlier, 
the Métis are descendants of French and English fur traders and Indigenous women. They are 
one of the three groups recognized as Aboriginal in the Constitution of Canada. In 2003, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that individuals who identified as Métis and were accepted by a 
contemporary existing Métis community could exercise Aboriginal hunting rights.
55
 After that 
decision, individuals in various regions of Canada self-identified as Métis and claimed to be 
exempt from provincial hunting regulations. Courts rejected cases where the claimants were 
unable to demonstrate their connection to a historical Métis community. For example, in one 
case, the judge found that the individual claiming to be Métis was ten to twelve generations 
removed from a Chief who had signed a Treaty in 1693. The individual discovered his 
Aboriginal lineage when he was 32 years old. The Court continued: 
 
… he demonstrates no connection to any contemporary rights-bearing community, or for 
that matter, to any Indian band or other aboriginal community, rights-bearing or not. ... 
Membership in self-styled organizations does not make one aboriginal for purposes of 
constitutional exemptions.
56
   
  
The UN Committee for the Elimination of Racism also found that cultural factors were important 
for determining whether an individual was indigenous. The issue was raised at the Committee 
after the Finland Supreme Administrative Court decided to allow voting for the Saami 
Parliament by any person with any ancestor registered as “Lapp” dating back to as far as 1763.
57
  
The Saami Parliament had more stringent requirements for voting, including that at least one 
parent or grandparent, spoke Saami as a first language.
58
 The UN Committee recommended that 
the state give recognition to the narrower Saami Parliament requirements that included cultural 
ties to the Saami. 
 
 (ii) Conclusion on obligation to Indigenous individuals 
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While the Declaration does not contain any definition for an Indigenous individual, precedents 
from international bodies and some domestic courts indicate that a genealogical connection on its 
own, especially when it dates back many generations, will not be enough to require recognition 
by the State. The individual will have to show some ties and on-going participation in the 
activities of an existing Indigenous community or nation in order to be considered Indigenous for 
the purpose of exercising the rights set out in the Declaration. 
 
 
C.  What is the State obligation to recognize the “right to belong”? 
 
This part of our discussion of Article 9 will focus on state legislation that provides definitions for 
membership and the extension of State benefits and rights to Indigenous peoples and individuals 
who are recognized in State legislation.  
 
 (i) Defining membership 
 
Some States have very detailed legislation on who is considered “Indigenous.”
59
 In Taiwan, for 
example, legislation sets out a list of groups that are recognized as “Indigenous”
 60
 and sets out 
extensive rules on who is a member of an Indigenous community and who is not. Membership is 
based on permanent residency in specified regions as well as on whether an individual or their 
immediate kin are registered in the census as being of Indigenous descent.  The Status Act 
addresses what happens on marriage to a non-Indigenous person, what happens to children who 
are born out of wedlock and the effect of adoption on status.
61
  In Canada, the Indian Act also has 
complex rules on defining “Indians.”
62
  State legislation that defines membership can be 
problematic if they are too exclusionary, as in the case of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, which imposed the requirement that beneficiaries be of at least “one quarter 
Native blood.”, leading to fears of a decrease in membership as young people have children with 
non-Indigenous partners.
63
 Conversely, problems arise where legislation is over-inclusive,as in 
Australia where the statute-imposed definition of “Aboriginal” has caused some controversy 
among Aboriginal communities who criticize the definition for including individuals who 
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 (ii) State obligation to facilitate belonging 
 
The identification of specific Indigenous communities is becoming increasingly important both 
for agreements which address past wrongs perpetrated by States, and for new agreements relating 
to the use of traditional territories for resource extraction. These agreements play a key part in 
fulfilling many of the State’s obligations under the Declaration in relation to land and self-
determination.
65
 However, these rights cannot be enjoyed unless Indigenous individuals belong 
to an Indigenous nation or community. When the State is or has been complicit in the creation of 
circumstances which create a group of Indigenous people without a recognized Indigenous 
nation or community, such as disenfranchisement through legislation, the State should be obliged 
to do more than passively recognize the right to belong. The State should facilitate the creation 
of a group to which the individual might belong in order to benefit from the rights in the 
Declaration. This obligation does not appear to have been addressed by any international bodies, 
but there have been law reform recommendations in New Zealand and Canada that have 
addressed this problem. 
 
In the case of the urban Māori, the New Zealand Law Commission, in its report Waka Umanga: 
A Proposed Law for Māori Governance, recommended creating a special corporate vehicle 
called the waka umanga to provide a legal structure to Māori communities. The waka umanga 
would have some of the characteristics of a corporation but most of the internal governance 
arrangements would be developed by the Māori collectivity. The Law Commission regarded the 
hapu (sub-tribe) as the basic community unit, and suggested that there should be at least fifty 
members for the group to be viable: 
 
A viable hapu being one that can respectably manage customary requirements in 
welcoming, feeding and bedding other tribal groups. That probably requires an active and 




The Law Commission recommended that fifteen people could propose or oppose the creation of 
a waka umanga and that disputes could be taken to the Māori Land Court, which has expertise on 
Māori issues. Initially, it would be those individuals that get together to make or oppose the waka 
umanga that would determine the membership of the group. Outside of the requirement for the 
minimum size of a hapu, there would be no imposed criteria. The Law Commission stated that 
“it is the right of a tribe to determine its own membership and membership rules.” 
67
   
 
In Canada, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also considered a process for creating 
Indigenous nations with their own land bases and self-governing jurisdiction. According to the 
Commission, Canada’s six hundred or so “Indian bands” created under the Indian Act would 
need to be reconstituted as larger nations based on 60-80 traditional affiliations.
68
  These larger 
nations would hold the inherent right to self-government. The Commission suggested that a 
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charter group, such as a group of bands currently recognized under the Indian Act, could hold a 
referendum to determine whether to proceed toward self-government. This group would then 
develop a constitution and membership criteria that would be inclusive of those historically 
excluded by the membership criteria of the Indian Act. Membership would not depend on blood 
quantum. Rather, the Commission contemplated that there would be wide consultation with all 
potential members, and that prior to being recognized by the government, the constitution and 





While neither of these initiatives has been implemented, they stand as examples of the type of 
policies that would fulfill the State’s obligations under Article 9. 
 
 (iii) Conclusion on the right to belong 
 
Article 9 states that the right to belong is to be realized according to the “traditions and customs” 
of Indigenous peoples. It follows that State legislation defining who is and who is not a member   
is valid only to the extent that the legislation is congruent with the customs and traditions of the 
Indigenous community or nation. This is not to say that legislation is not necessary. Since 
governments can only act through legislative mandates, there must be legislation. However, like 
Sweden’s Reindeer Husbandry Act, which recognizes membership decisions made by the Saami 
village, State legislation need not set out complex rules on membership. As Kirsty Gover, one of 
the chapter authors of this book states,  
 
… the goal is not to design and impose regulatory criteria defining indigeneity, but to 
operationalize in public law the cultural concept as it emerges from indigenous practices 
of recognition. In this way, the concept of public indigeneity can be created by the 




In addition, where the State has been complicit in the creation of groups of Indigenous 
individuals who do not belong to an Indigenous community or nation, the State has a positive 
obligation to create mechanisms in consultation with the Indigenous individuals in question to 
facilitate the creation of new groupings of Indigenous communities and nations to implement the 
right to belong. 
 
 
D.  What is the “discrimination” that the State is obligated to avoid? 
 
Being recognized as Indigenous can bring benefits and rights to communities and individuals. In 
Taiwan, for example, Indigenous people are entitled to preferential access to natural resources;
71
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preferred placement and subsidies for schools;
72
 preferential hiring for jobs;
73
 and assistance in 
obtaining intellectual property rights over Indigenous intellectual creations.
74
 Because of these 
rights and benefits, the government has an economic interest in being able to identify clearly who 
is eligible, and an interest in limiting the numbers of those eligible. As mentioned above, Taiwan 
addresses this issue by legislating detailed rules on membership. Inevitably, the existence of 
State legislation will result in situations where an individual claims to be Indigenous, and may 
even be accepted by an Indigenous community, but where the government refuses to extend 
rights and benefits because that individual does not qualify under the legislation.  
 
In Canada, this discrepancy is even spelled out in the Indian Act.  The Act sets out detailed 
criteria for determining who is registered as an “Indian” for the purposes of the Act. For example, 
a child must generally have at least two grandparents who are registered as an Indian in order to 
be eligible for registration. However, the Act allows communities of Indians (called Bands) to 
decide who will be members of the communities.  Under this system, some Bands will allow 
children to be members even if they have only one grandparent who is registered under the 
Indian Act.   However, the Act states that the Canadian government will extend benefits, such as 
exemption from income tax, only to those individuals who qualify to be registered under the 




In this context, what does the non-discrimination clause in Article 9 mean?  Does it mean that the 
State cannot discriminate in its law and programs between those citizens who are not Indigenous 
and those citizens who are members of Indigenous groups?  Or does it mean that the State cannot 
discriminate among members within an Indigenous community or nation?   
 
Given that Indigenous individuals are already protected against discrimination vis a vis non-
Indigenous citizens by many other Articles in the Declaration (eg. Articles  2, 15, 16, 21, 22, 24, 
29), we do not think that the first possibility- that the clause refers to the State’s obligation not to 
discriminate between Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens of the State- is correct.  
 
A better explanation is that Article 9 was intended to ensure that, once an individual is 
recognized as Indigenous according the customs and traditions of an Indigenous community or 
nation, the State must treat that individual the same as all other members of that community or 
nation. For example, it may be that this clause will prohibit the discrimination in the Canadian 
legislation mentioned above, where some Band members are recognized under the Indian Act for 
benefits, whereas other Band members do not receive benefits. 
 
IV. Analysis of Article 33:  Right to Determine Own Identity or Membership 
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This Article overlaps with Article 9, but has a slightly different focus. Article 9 provides 
Indigenous peoples and groups with the right to belong, a right that groups or individuals could 
claim against the State. Article 33 focuses on the right of Indigenous peoples to decide on 
membership and the obligations of Indigenous peoples to their own members.  
 
The concept of self-identification found in Article 33 has been endorsed by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. In its 2009 report, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over 
Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, the Commission refers to Article 33.1 in the 
context of a discussion supporting Indigenous self-identification.
76
 Two cases at the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights have also endorsed this Article. In the case of the Kichwa 
Indigenous People of  Sarayaku v Ecuador (2010),
77
 the applicants brought a complaint against 
Ecuador for granting an oil concession and allowing an Argentinean company to undertake 
seismic exploration in Sarayaku territory without prior consultation or consent of the Sarayaku.  
The Court refers to the right to cultural identity and mentions a number of Articles from the 
Declaration, including Article 33.
78
 In the case of the Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala 
79
 the 
Court mentions Article 33 together with other Articles from the Declaration in the context of 
discussing state-Indigenous relations and the connection of Río Negro inhabitants to their land.
80 
 
 Article 33 raises the following issues: 
 
 (A) Are “Indigenous people” the same as an “Indigenous community or nation”? 
 (B) What does it mean to determine identity or membership? 
 (C) What limitations are there on “customs and traditions”? 
 (D) What does it mean to have citizenship in the States in which they live? 
 (E) What are the rights with respect to structures and institutions of membership? 
 
A.  Are “Indigenous people” the same as an “Indigenous community or nation”? 
 
Article 33 recognizes that “Indigenous peoples” have the right to their own identity or 
membership, whereas Article 9 refers to membership in an Indigenous “community or nation.”  
There is no explanation of this difference in the drafting record.  
 
An interpretation that would make sense would see Article 9 address rights to belong to 
Indigenous communities or nations that have governance structures that could apply the 
“customs and traditions” to membership decisions.  These communities or nations may not be as 
large as an entire “Indigenous people.”  For example, as we explain in our discussion of Article 
36 below, an “Indigenous people” may be divided by State borders and there may not be a single 
governance structure on both sides of the border, even if they are a single “Indigenous people.” 
Therefore, Article 33 may refer to the abstract right of an Indigenous people as a whole to 
                                                 
76
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, , Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over Their Ancestral 
Lands and Natural Resources,(2009) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.56/09 para 30. 
77
   Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C), No 245 para 217. 
78
 Ibid para 217. 
79
 Caso masacres de Río Negro v Guatemala (2012), Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C), No 250. 
80
 Ibid para 52.  
21 
 
control membership, whereas Article 9 may refer to the rights of individual Indigenous people to 
belong to an Indigenous group.      
 
Having said this, we are not able to see any practical implications that arise from this difference 
in wording. 
 
B.  What does it mean to determine identity or membership? 
 
The right described in Article 33 encompasses two different concepts: identity and membership. 
 
The right to determine identity makes it clear that Indigenous people decide what to call 
themselves and how they identify the constituent groupings that make up the people as a whole.     
The Inter-American Court reinforced this concept, in interpreting the American Convention on 
Human Rights.  In this case, the Court upheld the land rights of an Indigenous community that 
was “multi-ethnic” 
81
 in the sense that the community was composed of peoples who had been 
historically distinct. The Court stated, 
 
…  it is not for the Court or the State to determine the Community’s name or ethnic 
identity. As the State itself recognizes, it “cannot [...] unilaterally assign or deny names of 
[the] Indigenous communities, because this action corresponds to the Community 
concerned.” The identification of the Community, from its name to its membership, is a 




The concept of identity would also be applicable in the case of people like the Inuit, the Saami, 
the Mohawk or the Pygmies/Batwa who are separated by State boundaries. Those people have 
the right to identify themselves as one people notwithstanding their residence in different States. 
As we will see below, under Article 36, States have an obligation to take “effective measures” to 
facilitate contact across international borders.  
 
Membership refers to the right of the indigenous people to decide which individuals belong to 
the community or nation. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
considered Article 33 in 2013, in a comment on the decision of the Finland Supreme 
Administrative Court to permit any individual who self-identified as a Saami to vote for the 
Saami Parliament. As noted above in section III.B of this chapter, the Finnish court overruled the 
decision of the Saami Parliament to restrict voters to those who self-identified and met a 
language requirement. The CERD noted that the court decision gives “insufficient weight” to the 
right of Saami to determine their membership under Article 33.
83
  
This Article was also considered by the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2010 in 
response to a complaint from Mohawks about problems crossing the US-Canada border. The 
Mohawk territory straddles the border, and to get from one part of the Canadian reserve to 
another part of the Canadian reserve, it is necessary to cross through the part of the reservation 
located in the United States. The Permanent Forum urged Canada and the United States “to 
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respect the right of Indigenous nations to determine their own membership, in accordance with 




 C. What limitations are there on “customs and traditions”? 
 
The “customs and traditions” of Indigenous people are to be determined by Indigenous people 
themselves. But what happens if these “customs and traditions” result in gender discrimination or 
are inconsistent with other international human rights standards? We discuss this issue in the 
context of an ongoing debate over tribal membership in the United States. 
  
(i) Is there a limitation on the right to determine tribal membership in the United States? 
 
In the United States, federally-recognized tribes have their own inherent jurisdiction to determine 
membership through their tribal constitutions. This jurisdiction has been upheld by the US 
Supreme Court in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez,
85
 in which the court considered a 
Pueblo tribal law which provided that the children of a woman who married out of the tribe lost 
their tribal membership, but the children of a male tribal member who married out of the tribe 
did not lose their membership. Julia Martinez, a Pueblo woman married a Navajo man and had a 
daughter. The family continued to live on the Santa Clara Pueblo reserve. The mother and a child 
challenged the tribal law as discriminatory.  The US Supreme Court held that federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction to deal with claims because enforcement of tribal law was a tribal matter.  
The response to this decision was been varied, with some hailing it as an affirmation of tribal 
sovereignty
86





In recent years, other examples of apparent discrimination have arisen in the United States  tribal 
system, particularly in relation to decisions by some tribes to ‘disenroll’ certain members.  
Perhaps the best known case is that of the Cherokee Freedmen, who were descendants of African 
Americans who had lived with the Cherokee for generations as members of the tribe. In 2007, 
the Cherokee Nation amended its constitution to remove 2,800 Freedmen from membership, 
effectively stripping the Freedmen of all political and economic rights associated with being a 
member of the tribe. The tribe’s decision was upheld by the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court in 
2011.
88
  The Nooksack tribe was also involved in a disenrollment initiative, in this case of tribe 
members who were descended from families who had married Filipinos.
89
 Racial issues play into 
these decisions, but commentators also point to the distribution of casino profits as a reason for 
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decreasing enrolled members. By reducing the number of members, the remaining members will 
receive greater share of the casino profits.
90
   
 
Native American commentators have further noted that there is a lack of recourse for Indigenous 
individuals in cases of apparent discrimination on the part of Indigenous groups. As academic 
and tribal court judge Wenona Singel observes: 
 
This gap in the human rights system exists because tribes do not have direct obligations 
under public international law, they are largely immune from external accountability 
under the domestic law of the United States, and they are frequently immune from 




On the one hand, an argument can be made that tribes are acting within their rights under Article 
33 in deciding membership “in accordance with their customs and traditions.” However, it can 
also be argued that these rights are limited by provisions in the Declaration that limit the 
authority of Indigenous institutions.  Article 44, for example, states that the rights in the 
Declaration will be “equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals,” and Article 
46 states that the exercise of the rights in the Declaration are to be interpreted “in accordance 
with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, 
good governance and good faith.” 
92
The application of these standards to the membership 
provisions of the Declaration was contemplated during the drafting stage. Some States proposed       
to add the words “where those traditions and customs are consistent with international human 
rights standards” to the Articles dealing with membership, but decided to withdraw the 




Given the intent of Articles 44 and 46 and discussion in the drafting history, it is clear that the 
Declaration does not contemplate an absolute right to determine membership. In the case of the 
Cherokee Freedmen or the Santa Clara Pueblo, it follows that the tribes’ actions should be 





Having said this, Articles 44 and 46 should be applied sensitively so that they do not result in 
taking away the autonomy of the Indigenous people involved. The International Law 
Association, in its commentary on Articles 44 and 46 suggests that collective and individual 
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rights “must be properly balanced in order to ascertain how and to what extent both rights can be 
accommodated.” 
95
  What this means in the case of the Cherokee Freedmen and the Santa Clara 
Pueblo, is that the tribes’ actions must be scrutinized, but the result of the scrutiny is not a 
foregone conclusion.  
 
 (ii) The necessity of genealogical connection for membership 
 
The nuances needed or an appropriate balance is especially important in evaluating the 
appropriate genealogical connection needed to become a member – often referred to as the 
“blood quantum” rule. Kirsty Gover argues that a genealogical connection can play a legitimate 
role in the customs and traditions of an Indigenous people.
96
 Canada’s Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples came to a different position in its 1996 Report. The Commissioners, the 
majority of whom were Indigenous, clearly saw Indigenous nations as political units, not ethnic 
enclaves: 
 
The Commission concludes that under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, an 
Aboriginal nation has the right to determine which individuals belong to the nation as 
members and citizens. …… [However] it cannot specify a minimum blood quantum as a 
general prerequisite for citizenship.  Modern Aboriginal nations, like other nations in the 
world today, represent a mixture of genetic heritages. Their identity lies in their collective 
life, their history, ancestry, culture, values, traditions and ties to the land, rather than in 




Similarly, for Michael Oeser, the question of who is a tribal citizenship should “speak to a 
person’s political identity, as opposed to ancestral or cultural identity.”
98
 Oeser argues that 
American tribes should abandon exclusive reliance on minimum blood quantum or lineal descent 
in determining citizenship, and instead adopt two-part citizenship requirements based on lineal 
descent and non-genealogical criteria such as birth within the nation, birth to citizen parents, 
residency, cultural integration, historical knowledge, governmental knowledge, civil service.
99
 
Articles 44 and 46 does not provide an a priori answer to the debate on genealogical connection, 
and will have to be applied in the context of situations as they arise. 
 
  (iii) Application of the Declaration on tribal governments 
 
If there is an irreconcilable conflict between international standards and the “customs and 
traditions” of Indigenous people the next challenge is to decide how those international standards 
should be implemented. The United Nations standards apply only to States, not tribes, and 
accordingly American tribes, to the extent that they are exercising inherent tribal jurisdiction, do 
not come under the purview of these standards. This has led lawyer Greg Rubio to suggest that 
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the United States government should be responsible for ensuring that international standards 
relating to discrimination apply to tribal governments.
100
  In the case of the Cherokee Freedman, 
tremendous federal government pressure, including threats to withhold funding, ultimately led to 
the Cherokees’ reversal of their decision to disenroll the Freedmen.  While the actions of the 
United States government clearly interfered with the sovereignty of the tribe, under Rubio’s 
approach, the American government could be seen as fulfilling its obligations under international 
law.   
 
The idea that only States have the power to ensure that Indigenous people comply with the 
standards set out in the Declaration seems counterintuitive, given that the thrust of the 
Declaration is to recognize greater autonomy for Indigenous peoples. It also seems odd that the 
Indigenous peoples that are recognized as having self-determination powers under the 
Declaration would not also be bound to comply with the Declaration itself.  This is especially 
true for Tribal governments that have endorsed the UN Declaration.
 101
 In general, those tribes  
which have endorsed the Declaration as a means to enforce the individual and collective rights of 
their citizens against the State, including by asserting greater control over proposed resource 
development activities which threaten traditional lands and sacred sites.
102
  However, it would 
seem very odd that a tribe would endorse the Declaration but argue that the provisions of the 
Declaration did not apply to the operations of the Tribal government.
103
  We could not find 
international precedent that addresses this situation, but there is a possibility of an approach that 
will provide for the application of international human rights standards directly on Indigenous 
peoples. 
 
We suggest that the Declaration contemplates the creation of Indigenous entities that are not 
fully nation states, but that are sufficiently autonomous to be able to implement United Nations 
standards.  By recognizing the right to determine community membership, as well as requiring 
that Indigenous peoples’ institutions comply with international human rights standards, the 
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Declaration implicitly necessitates the creation of Indigenous political entities with governance 
structures capable of ensuring that the customs, policies and laws of the Indigenous people 
conform to international standards.  In this model, Indigenous authorities would have the 
jurisdiction and obligation to impose international standards directly without requiring recourse 
to the nation state. This would at least recognize that Indigenous peoples were bound by the 
provisions of the Declaration and that indigenous decision-making bodies could be the subject of 
comment by international bodies, in the same way that States can be the subject of such 
comment.  Whether States also have a concomitant obligation to ensure that Indigenous peoples 
are complying with the terms of the Declaration is not answered by this approach.  It may be that 
State obligations under the Declaration remains, but to the extent that Indigenous peoples 
themselves address the limitations imposed by Articles 44 and 46, States may show deference to 
the Indigenous approach. Or it may be that the State has no obligation to monitor compliance 
with the provisions of the Declaration once the Indigenous people act within their jurisdiction to 
determine membership. While a more complete exploration of this issue is not possible within 





D. What does it mean to have citizenship in the States in which they live? 
 
The right to obtain citizenship is the right of Indigenous individuals and reinforces Article 6, 
which states that “Every Indigenous individual has a right to a nationality.”    
 
This provision in Article 33 prevents the State from denying citizenship to a member of an 
Indigenous community. Ecuador implements this right in its Constitution as follows: 
 
Ecuadorian nationality is a political and legal bond between individuals and the State, 





The Constitution of Bolivia similarly provides for a clear expression of the coexistence of 
Indigenous membership and state citizenship by permitting individuals to register their cultural 




But this Article does more than provide for a passive obligation to permit members of 
Indigenous communities to obtain citizenship in the State. Combined with the right to a 
nationality in Article 6, and the ameliorative purpose of the Declaration, this Article should be 
interpreted as requiring States to take positive steps to facilitate registration as citizens. While we 
have found no comments on this part of Article 33 in international or domestic law, a case under 
the American Convention on Human Rights addresses the issue of registration. The  Inter-
American Court of Human Rights held in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
that Paraguay had the obligation  to "implement mechanisms enabling all persons to register their 
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births and get any other identification documents,"
107
 especially in the case of vulnerable 
groups.
108
 In Sawhoyamaxa, the court held that Paraguay had violated several individuals’ right 
to a legal personality,
109
 as it failed to register 18 out of the 19 Sawhoyamaxa people (mostly 





E. What are the rights with respect to structures and institutions (Article 33.2)? 
 
The right in Article 33.2 to “determine the structures and to select the membership of their 
institutions in accordance with their own procedures” is very similar to Article 34, which 
recognizes Indigenous peoples’ right to “promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures.”
111
 There are three  differences between the Articles. First, Article 33.2 refers to 
structures and institutions related to membership, while Article 33 refers to a right to develop 
institutional structures in general.  Second, Article 33.2 specifically includes the right to select 
the membership of the institutions, whereas Article 34 is silent on this point. Third, Article 34 
states that the institutions must conform to “international human rights standards,” whereas 
Article 33.2 is silent on this point.  
 
There was no discussion of this difference during the drafting stages, and it is not necessary to 
make fine distinctions between these two Articles. The overall intent of these Articles, taken 
together, is clear: Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own institutional structures, 
which necessarily includes the right to decide the composition of its members. International 
human rights standards apply to both Articles, either because it is directly mentioned (Article 34) 
or because of the application of Article 44 (gender equality) and Article 46 (human rights and 
good governance).  
 
 
V. Analysis of Article 35: Right to Determine Responsibility of Members 
 
This Article provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities 
of individuals to their communities.” The wording is curious, especially in light of Article 4 
which provides for the “right to autonomy or self-government”.  
 
Article 35 raises the following issues: 
 
(A)  What is the difference between determining responsibilities under Article 35 and 
having a right to autonomy or self-government in Article 4? 
(B) Are there limits on the types of responsibilities that can be assigned to individuals? 
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 A.   What is the difference between determining responsibilities in Article 35 and having a right 
to autonomy or self-government in Article 4? 
 
In a liberal democratic state, one would usually cast the relationship between individuals and 
communities as one where citizens have the presumed right to live autonomously, subject to 
limitations established by the State in order to ensure the welfare of the citizenry as a whole. The 
corollary is that if there is no rule prohibiting or prescribing a specific action, there is no 
requirement to conform to any particular form of behaviour.  
 
By contrast, Article 35 contemplates the possibility of a different type of relationship within 
Indigenous communities.  It is not a relationship based on coercive laws imposed on individuals 
through the organs of the State, but rather a relationship based on individual members assuming 
responsibilities to the collective.  The responsibilities can be articulated as a set of expected 
behaviours rather than a list of prescriptive rules enforced through rigid hierarchies found in the 
legislatures, police and judiciaries of the nation State. In an Indigenous society, power may be 
more diffuse and norms may be established through mechanisms such as feasts, ceremonies and 
informal dispute resolution.
112
 In this sense, then, Article 35 is complementary to Article 4. 
Whereas Article 4 can be seen as creating space for Indigenous agency through the recognition 
of self-determination, Article 35 articulates the relationship between individuals and the 
collective within that space.  
 
In making this observation, we do not intend to essentialize Indigenous social structures, and we 
note that Article 35 could also take in a wide range of modalities that include the fairly structured 
governance structures found in American tribes. The Indian Law Resource Centre in the United 
States, for example,  sees Article 35 as a basis for tribes “to make their own laws about what 





B.  Are there limits on the types of responsibilities that can be assigned to individuals? 
 
We have noted above an early version of this Article contained a clause requiring the exercise of 
this right to conform to international human rights standards. The clause was removed, but in our 
view, Article 44 (gender equality) and Article 46 (human rights and good governance), apply to 




A more challenging limit will be the presence of State legislation which conflicts with the 
responsibilities assigned by Indigenous peoples.
115
 Those issues are addressed in this book on 
discussions on self-determination in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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V. Analysis of Article 36: The Right to Maintain Relations across Borders 
 
The territories of Indigenous peoples long predate the borders of the modern nation-state, and in 
most cases, national borders do not conform with the pre-existing territories of Indigenous 
peoples. As a result, Indigenous peoples’ ability to maintain their culture and traditional practices 
may be significantly compromised where their territories and traditional lands are intersected by 
international borders. Article 36 of the Declaration attempts to address this issue by recognizing 
the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain and develop contacts, relations and activities for 
spiritual, cultural, economic and political activities across borders, and by placing a positive 
obligation on States to take “effective measures” to ensure the implementation of the right.  
 
The text of Article 36 raises the following issues: 
 
(A) What are the types of “contacts, relations and cooperation” that would constitute 
“effective measures”? 
(B) What “effective measures” can be taken with respect to crossing international 
borders? 
 
A. What are the types of “contacts, relations and cooperation” that would constitute “effective 
measures”? 
 
One avenue by which Indigenous peoples have effectively exercised their rights under Article 36 
is through international organizations which promote relations and political connections across 
national borders.  
 
 (i) The Draft Nordic Saami Convention 
 
The most ambitious initiative to address cross-border issues is the draft Nordic Saami 
Convention. If ratified, the Convention could meet or in some aspects exceed the standards for 
the facilitation of cross-border Indigenous rights established under Article 36.  
  
The Saami are a nomadic people who follow the seasonal migration of reindeer herds across the 
international boundaries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula of the Russian 
Federation.116 In 2005, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Saami people released a draft 
convention  that  would set out the framework by which the States would recognize the rights of 
the Saami across state borders.117 The aim was to have the Convention finalized by 2015, but as 




According to Timo Koivurova, the draft Convention would exceed the scope of rights under 
Article 36 by going beyond facilitating cooperation between groups, to exercising collective self-
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determination across international borders.119 The Convention would create a “gradual process 
whereby the Saami and the three Nordic nations may develop their relationship in such a manner 
that we might perceive four nations, coexisting in the same physical space, composed of the 
territories of three States.”120 The draft Convention provides, among other things, for the right of 
the Saami to compensation and profit-sharing in relation to natural resource use, as well as for 
the right of the Saami to be engaged in the co-determination and environmental management of 
lands and resources in areas traditionally used by the Saami.121 
   
However, the reluctance of some States to finalize the draft in its current form emphasizes the 
contentious nature of state recognition of cross-border Indigenous rights.122  For example, the 
draft Convention falls short of fully harmonizing States’ practices and legislation with respect to 
how the Saami rights-holder is defined. As currently worded, the draft emphasizes the 
homogeneity of the Saami, but also provides different ways for the participating States to define 
who is Saami.123  
 
Nevertheless, if adopted, the Convention will stand as an example of how the cross-border rights 
of an Indigenous people can be recognized and facilitated by nation state, and of how this 
recognition may both co-exist with and pose a challenge to pre-conceived notions of state 
sovereignty. 
 
(ii) The Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
 
The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), an NGO created in 1977 to represent 55,000 Inuit of 
Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka (Russia), is one group which is actively exercising the 
right to maintain and develop cultural, spiritual, social, and economic relations across 
international boundaries.124 The ICC aims to “strengthen unity among Inuit of the circumpolar 
region; promote Inuit rights and interests on an international level; develop and encourage long-
term policies that safeguard the Arctic environment; and seek full and active partnerships in 
political, economic and social development in the circumpolar region.”125 The ICC’s objectives 
of strengthening both cultural and political relations across national borders falls squarely within 
the rights described in Article 36. 
 
The ICC is active on an international level in relation to a variety of issues including: the 
promotion of the Inuit language, trade, the environment, resource use, and human rights. To this 
end, the ICC maintains involvement in a number of international bodies such as the Arctic 
Council, the United Nations, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Convention on 
the Trade of Endangered Species, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Organization 
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of American States, and the International Whaling Commission.126 Between 2002 and 2006, the 
ICC focused particularly on the Arctic Council, an eight-nation intergovernmental body where 
governments and Indigenous peoples’ organizations work together on issues related to the 
environment and sustainable development in the Arctic.127 In addition, the ICC holds consultative 
status II at the United Nations and was active within the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including 
the UN Human Rights Commission and its Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The ICC 
participated in the drafting of the Declaration, and cites the elimination of any specific reference 
to “the principle of territorial integrity of States” as one of its key successes.128  
 
The ICC’s work in uniting and promoting Inuit interests exemplifies how Indigenous groups who 
are divided by state borders have successfully worked together to build connections across 
international boundaries for both cultural exchanges and political coordination. In this sense, the 
ICC’s work is a positive example of Indigenous peoples exercising the right to maintain and 
develop cultural, social, political and economic relations across national borders.  
 
However, for many Indigenous groups the promotion of cross-border connections will have little 
practical utility unless States also fulfil their obligation under Article 36 to facilitate the 
movement of Indigenous peoples across national borders. As the subsequent section will suggest, 
significant challenges arise in respect of the implementation of Article 36 where perceived issues 
of border security and national autonomy are engaged. 
 
B. What “effective measures” can be taken with respect to crossing international borders? 
 
Globally, the extent to which States acknowledge and facilitate the cross-border rights of 
Indigenous peoples ranges from Ecuador’s explicit constitutional guarantee of the right of 
Indigenous peoples to develop contacts with peoples divided by international borders,
 129
 to the 
United States’ construction of a militarized fence on the United States-Mexico border. The 
following examples provide an overview of the considerable disparity amongst States’ 
approaches to ensuring that Indigenous peoples divided by international borders can exercise 
their rights under Article 36. 
 
 (i) Africa’s Recognition of the Rights of Nomadic Peoples 
 
In Africa, there is wide-spread state discrimination towards Indigenous groups who carry on a 
nomadic way of life across international borders . For example, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights describes the marginalization of nomadic groups such as the 
Pygmies/Batwa, who practice a forest-based culture and experience varying degrees of exclusion 
and discrimination in a number of different nations including Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the  
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville.130 Rather than facilitating 
the right of the Pygmies to maintain their nomadic way of life, which spans a number of 
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international borders, steps taken by States to protect the Pygmies are made with the goal “to 
assimilate the Pygmies into the dominant culture and not to promote multiculturalism.”131 In 
some States, officials consider that the “permanent settlement of the Pygmies is inevitable and 
irreversible, if they are to become true partners in the national economy.”132 
 
Similarly, other African States use the notion of the sanctity of borders to deny the nomadic 
inhabitants the right to associate with their kin or to access resources in different countries. For 
example, nomadic inhabitants of the Kidal region of Mali have experienced harassment as they 
attempt to cross into Algeria. A report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights states that these nomadic peoples have been beaten, searched, or imprisoned when they 




As these examples suggest, where States refuse to take positive steps to facilitate border 
crossing, it is difficult for many nomadic peoples in Africa to realize the practical benefits of 
their rights under Article 36.  
 
 (ii) United States – Canada border 
 
The United States and Canada recognize, to a limited extent, the rights of Indigenous peoples to 
maintain and develop their culture across the United States -Canada border. However, although 
the United States and Canada differ in their approach to cross-border Indigenous issues, neither 
country has demonstrated complete adherence to the principles set out in Article 36.  
 
Perhaps the most significant acknowledgement of the rights of Indigenous peoples whose 
territory crosses the United States -Canada border is the United States’ recognition of a right for 
Indigenous people who possess the requisite blood quantum requirement to pass freely from 
Canada to the United States This right is recognized by the United States through the Jay Treaty, 
and has been subsequently acknowledged by American courts and codified in its immigration 
laws.134 As a result, Aboriginal people born in Canada who meet the blood quantum requirement 
prescribed by the state are entitled to enter the United States for purposes of employment, study, 
retirement, investing and/ or immigration.135   
 
In granting the right to free passage for Canadian-born Aboriginal people, the United States 
explicitly acknowledges the rights of Indigenous peoples to maintain their culture across 
international borders. However, this recognition is limited by the fact that applicants must 
provide documentation demonstrating that they possess 50% ‘American Indian blood.’136  The 
fact that Canadian law does not define who is Aboriginal by blood status creates further 
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complications in an applicant’s ability to establish his or her Indigenous identity when crossing 
the border. Additionally, the fact that both Canada and the United States maintain the right to 
define who is an Indigenous person for cross-border purposes places an inherent limit on the 
extent to which these countries actively facilitate the rights under Article 36.  
 
Unlike the United States, Canada does not recognize that Aboriginal people have an inherent 
right to cross the Canada- United States border. Instead, Canadian courts have approached the 
right to free passage by considering the applicant’s Aboriginal relationship to Canada in a 
historic and contemporary context.137 Canada does not recognize the right to free passage unless 
an Aboriginal person can establish, that he or she is an Indian registered under the Indian 
Act.138While decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have recognized the possibility of an 
Aboriginal right protected under Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 to pass freely across the 
Canada-United States border, the Court has thus far failed to expressly confirm the existence of 




For Indigenous groups whose territories are bisected by the international border, such as the 
Mohawks of Akwesasne, the problems associated with the United States and Canada’s failure to 
fully recognize cross-border rights are a daily reality. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the 
United States -Canada border runs directly through the Akwesasne community. In Akwesasne in 
Canada, the Canadian government maintains that, because the Mohawks moved into the area 
after the Jay Treaty was signed, the Treaty does not apply (notwithstanding the fact that the lands 
are a traditional territory of the Mohawk).
140
 On the United States side, Akwesasne members can 
exercise their rights to free passage if they meet the United States blood quantum requirements, 
but post 9/11 have to contend with significantly increased border security.
141
   
 
Akwesasne has had some success in having its rights implicitly recognized by the Canadian 
government. This Indigenous nation has successfully negotiated a remission order with Canada, 
which provides that Canada will not to collect taxes on goods acquired in the United States by a 
resident of Akwesasne for personal or household use.
142
 Akwesasne has also negotiated a 
political protocol with the Canadian government addressing issues over which Akwesasne can 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction, including initiatives that support the social and economic 
development of Akwesasne, divestiture of federal lands, border crossing, and tax exemption.
143
 
The international community has further implicitly acknowledged that the Haudenosaunee (of 
which the Mohawks of Akwesasne are a part) maintain one national identity, notwithstanding 
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divisions imposed by the international border, through the recognition of the Haudenosaunee 




In 2010, the Mohawks raised their border problems with the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, which urged Canada and the United States to implement Article 36: 
 
The Permanent Forum recommends that the Governments of Canada and the United 
States address the border issues, such as those related to the Mohawk Nation and the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy, by taking effective measures to implement article 36 of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which States that 
Indigenous peoples divided by international borders have the right to maintain and 





(iii) United States – Mexico border 
 
Unlike their northern counterparts, Indigenous peoples on the United States -Mexico border do 
not have the benefit of explicit recognition of the right to free passage in international treaties.146 
In recent decades, the rights of Indigenous peoples whose territories lie on the  United States-
Mexico border have been further marginalized by the increased militarization of the United 
States border. As Angelique EagleWoman notes, United States policies implemented under the 
premise of ensuring national security run directly counter to Article 36 of the Declaration, and 
could have the effect of criminalizing the cultural, social and economic ties of Indigenous groups 
whose territories cross the border.147  
 
The most visible example of the increased militarization is the ongoing construction of a 700-
mile double-layered fence which will separate the United States from Mexico, and in so doing, 
disrupt the lives and culture of Indigenous groups whose territories cross the international 
border.148 According to EagleWoman, “[s]acred sites are being desecrated by the Border Patrol, 
and access to such sites will be cut off if the double-layered fence is put into place.”149 
 
For the Tohono O’odham, whose reservation is contiguous with the United States -Mexico 
border, the United States’ increasingly militarized approach is a significant impediment to 
maintaining social, cultural, spiritual and economic ties with members on the opposite side of the 
border. Members who were once able to travel freely across the border are now forced to drive to 
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checkpoints which may be hours from their homes; furthermore, there have been reports of 
harassment and of members being turned away at the border by border officials. 150 The increased 
militarization also presents difficult economic and cultural choices for the Tohono O’doham, 
such as whether to bear the cost of developing government ID cards to cross the border on their 
own lands, and whether to take on the expense of policing the border themselves or to allow the 
United States or Mexican government law enforcement officers onto their lands.151 
 
On the other hand, the Kickapoo in Texas have successfully advocated for the passage of 
legislation which allows tribe members to pass over the United States-Mexico border for specific 
purposes, including to attend religious sites and to work as migrants in the United States.
152
 
According to Sapphire Diamant-Rink, the legislation “recognizes the unique cultural needs of the 
Kickapoo, granting them passage and the services provided to other Indigenous groups living 
solely in the United States.”153  
 
 C. Conclusion on cross-border rights 
 
Ultimately, the meaningful exercise of Indigenous cross-border rights is in large part dependent 
on the willingness of States to move past perceived concerns about state autonomy or long-
standing discrimination against nomadic peoples towards the active facilitation of Article 36. As 
the examples above illustrate, States have been inconsistent in ensuring the implementation of 
Article 36, and in some cases, appear to be taking measures directly contrary to the positive 
obligation imposed by the Article. Unless States are willing to actively fulfil their obligations 
pursuant to the Declaration, it will be impossible for Indigenous peoples to fully realize their 
rights to maintain and develop cultural, social, economic and political connections across the 




In this chapter we have examined Indigenous peoples’ rights related to membership and identity 
as set out in the Declaration from the interaction of three perspectives – the customs and 
traditions of Indigenous communities; the laws of the State; and international law. These 
perspectives take different approaches to the subject matter of this chapter, but we can suggest 
broad convergence on each of the Articles. 
 
Articles 9 and 33 raise issues related to indigeneity. What has emerged from the study in this 
chapter is that the “pre-invasion” paradigm developed primarily for the Americas, Australia and 
New Zealand, is a useful tool in conceptualizing who are indigenous and who not. However, 
even within that paradigm, there are situations, such as the Métis in Canada or the Maroons in 
South America, who do not fit neatly into the “pre-invasion” model. When we move to Africa 
and Asia, this paradigm becomes quite awkward to apply because of a number of factors, 
including a history of internal migrations and the dynamics of post-colonial development. This 
leaves us, we feel, with three contextual factors to consider in the recognition of Indigenous 
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peoples under the Declaration. To be considered “indigenous” in the context of the Declaration, 
the group in question would: 
 
1. self- identify as culturally  and linguistically distinct from other groups in the 
population; 
2. form a “non-dominant” sector of society; and 
3. have a historical connection to a collective territory.154   
Articles 9 and 33 also raise issues related to obligations of the State and the Indigenous nation or 
community to conform to international human rights standards. In our discussion on Article 33, 
we describe decisions made by American tribes on membership which may be contrary to 
established human rights norms. We argue that the control of membership is subject to the 
gender equality and international human rights norms set out in Article 44 and 46 of the 
Declaration. Furthermore, we raise the possibility that Indigenous governments, not State 
governments, are responsible for ensuring conformity with these norms. States also have 
responsibilities to recognize membership decisions made by Indigenous peoples and to avoid 
discriminating among members of an Indigenous people. We also argue that the ameliorative 
nature of the Declaration places positive obligations on States to ensure that Indigenous peoples 
are able to access State citizenship and to reconstitute Indigenous groups where such groups have 
been fragmented or dispersed due to the effects of colonialism.  
 
Article 35 addresses Indigenous peoples’ responsibilities to their communities, and in some ways 
addresses the same issue as Article 4 (autonomy and self-government). In our view the wording 
of Article 35 evokes different societal structures and creates a space for intra-community 
relationships that do not necessarily mimic the hierarchical structures of the nation-state. The 
responsibilities assigned to members, however, are bound by the human rights standards outlined 
in Articles 44 (gender equality) and 46 (human rights and good government).   
 
The discussion of contacts across borders set out in Article 36 suggests that Indigenous peoples 
have a right to identify themselves irrespective of the existence of State boundaries. However, 
States’ willingness to implement and facilitate the cross-border rights of Indigenous peoples is 
situation-specific and is often recognized in a limited manner, secondary to national security 
concerns. Arrangements which facilitate border-crossings and government funding for 
Indigenous organizations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the proposed Nordic-Saami 
Convention represent positive steps towards realizing the rights of Indigenous peoples across 
international borders. The construction of the US-Mexico fence and Canada’s refusal to 
acknowledge the Akwesasnes’ right to bring goods across the border, however, reflect instances 
of ongoing reluctance on the part of some States to fully recognize the cross-border rights of 
Indigenous groups. 
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The views expressed in this chapter are necessarily preliminary. We have attempted to illustrate 
examples of current state practices that may, or may not, be consistent with the provisions of the 
Declaration. The complex issues described above cannot be resolved in the abstract- rather, they 
must be addressed through the ongoing implementation of the Declaration. We look forward to 
observing developments in the years to come.  
 
 
   
 
